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MODELING PRICING AND SCHEDULING
STRATEGIES FOR AIR CARGO CARRIERS AS
NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
Oliver Feng-Yeu Shyr1 and Yuan-Lu Lee2

Key words: cargo carrier, pricing and scheduling, Nash equilibrium,
non-cooperative game.

ABSTRACT
To develop efficient pricing and service strategies for air
cargo carriers, we formulated air cargo demand as a Multinomial Logit model to reveal forwarders’ preferences toward
freightage, flight frequency and service reliability. By applying non-cooperative game approach, we solve the market
equilibrium to produce optimal freightage of priority and
ordinary cargo for forwarders with various shipping volumes
as well as the optimal flight schedules of air cargo carriers. In
the case study, we found that the leader of air carriers would
have not only the largest share, but also the highest freightage
for both ordinary and priority cargo. And, with the provision
of transfer flights, carriers could further reduce their operating
cost by 1% to 3%.

I. BACKGROUND
In recent years, the percentage of cargo being shipped by air
carriers has been increased significantly. According to the
business report presented by Airbus’ head of freighter marketing Lenormand [4], the air freight between North America
and East Asia is one of the fast growing markets in the world.
By 2023, its market share will hit 26.15%, making it the biggest market in the world. On the other hand, the high market
concentration ratio suggests that air cargo service is an oligopolistic market in transport industry. As a result, the efficiency of service network and pricing strategy are the major
factors affecting the performance of air cargo carriers. Because of the vigorous competition in the market, air cargo
carriers are keen to maintain or raise their market shares. The
strategies taken include freightage discount for frequent users
and increasing flight frequency for priority goods by using
Paper submitted 06/23/09; revised 04/26/10; accepted 01/11/11. Author for
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available cargo spaces in passenger flights.
Most of the recent studies focused on either the pricing
strategy or the scheduling efficiency of air freight transport.
For example, Xiao and Yang [16] apply non-cooperative game
among shippers, carriers and infrastructure companies (IC) to
explore the competitive equilibrium in an oligopolistic market
in a freight network. They assume that all three kinds of
players act as profit maximizing agents given that the carriers
and ICs would behave cooperatively in their own coalitions.
By using a three-stage game-theoretic model, they show that
the equilibrium flows can also maximize total system profits if
the IC and the carrier both use vertically efficient nonlinear
pricing schedules. A multi-market oligopoly model was employed by Zhang and Zhang [19] to examine the effect of
cargo liberalization on competition between all-cargo carriers
and mixed passenger/cargo carriers. They find that if home
carriers engage in the joint production of cargo and passenger
services, whereas foreign carriers produce the two outputs
separately, then unilateral cargo liberalization by the home
country will reduce home firm profits and increase foreign
profits, and raise air fares for passenger travel when foreign
competition in the passenger sector is limited. They suggested
that the separation of air cargo and passenger flights might be
fraught with difficulty in Asia due to the characteristics of its
air cargo market, in which most passenger carriers have substantial cargo businesses and operate “combi” fleets.
As for the scheduling problem, Yan, et al. [17] use timespace network techniques to formulate the models which deal
with the scheduling problems of international express carriers
to meet the new variable demands in real time. To efficiently
solve their models, an algorithm is developed with the assistance of mathematical programming solver, CPLEX. Tang, et
al. [14] developed an integrated scheduling model that combines passenger, cargo and “combi” flight scheduling. They
employed network flow techniques to construct the model
which is formulated as an integer multiple commodity network flow problem that is characterized as NP-hard. A family
of heuristics, based on Lagrangian relaxation, a sub-gradient
method, heuristics for the upper bound solution, and a flow
decomposition algorithm, was developed to solve the model.
Their test results, mainly using data from a major Taiwan
airline’s operations, show the good performance of the model
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and the solution algorithms.
There were also papers that dealt with the nature of the
market and the pricing strategy in general. Bowen and Leinbach [2] stated that a rapid increase in the level of market
concentration in supply chain industries has created firms that
enjoy the economies of scale and scope necessary to offer
multinational clients integrated services on a worldwide basis.
Their paper examines how changes in the structure of the
freight forwarding industry have affected the nature of the
services. They used data from interviews with over 100
freight forwarders in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines
to examine both the geographic variation in the provision of
air cargo services and the manner in which the types of services a forwarder offers vary with firm size. Park, et al. [9]
explore the relative importance of factors that influence the
adoption of air express delivery service, and evaluates the
competitiveness of air cargo express carriers in the Korean
market. They applied AHP analysis to show that accuracy and
promptness are the two most influential factors for competitiveness. Smith et al. [13] demonstrate the development, testing
and application of statistical models to study actual billings
(net of discounts) for expedited freight services. Their models
reveal the structure of net tariffs so that carriers can identify
customers and terminals whose revenues are deficient. And
their models show situations where business activities, pricing
structures or negotiated discounts need review and verify that
the overwhelming determinants of monthly charges to shippers are the fundamental cost drivers for the industry. Zhang,
et al. [18] examined the effect of multimodal integration on the
rivalry between two transport chains – a forwarder–airline
alliance and an integrator – under the economies of traffic
density. An improvement in multimodal integration by a
forwarder–airline alliance would increase the alliance’s output,
while reducing the integrator’s output, not only in the multimodal market but also in other markets of the cargo network.
It would further increase the alliance’s profit, provided the
intermodal improvement is not too costly, while reducing the
integrator’s profit, and would likely improve both consumer
surplus and total surplus. We also find that an alliance in
general leads to greater market shares for the firms involved
than outsourcing.
To incorporate the oligopolistic competition behavior into
the scheduling problem of all the carriers in the market, we
propose a three-stage framework. For stage one, we formulated and calibrated the payoff functions of air cargo carriers.
The payoff functions were partitioned into two parts, i.e., the
revenues derived from forwarders’ demand, and the costs for
the services. The demand was formulated as a Logit function
to reveal forwarders’ preferences toward freightage, flight
frequency and service reliability. And the cost function was
formulated by information provided by Oum and Yu [5]. For
stage two, we applied non-cooperative game approach, i.e., the
Bertrand model, to solve the optimal pricing strategies for
variable O-D demands under oligopoly market structure. For
stage three, we find the optimal flight frequency by solving
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cost minimization scheduling problem using the predicted
demand from stage two and repeat stage two with new flight
schedule. We stop the iterations if the variation of the freightage solved from two consecutive iterations in stage two is
small or the number of iterations exceeds our limit.
Inspired by Lenormand’s report, we demonstrated our
case study by using data based on the air cargo market of
Taipei to US West Coast served by three major cargo carriers,
i.e., China Airlines (CAL), EVA Airways and Northwest Airlines. We calibrated the cargo demand by using SP and RP
survey data from a stratified sampling of forwarders. Then by
using the iterative feedback approach, we solve the problem of
a non-linear mixed-integer system of equations that produces
the optimal freightage and the flight schedule of these air
cargo carriers.

II. MODEL FORMULATION
To start with the non-cooperative game among air cargo
carriers, we need to formulate the payoff functions [3], i.e., the
revenues and the costs as functions of freightage, flight frequency, and service reliability, for these carriers. These models were formulated based on the studies by Hansen [2], Nicole [4], Shyr and Chang [10], Shyr and Hung [11], and Shyr
and Kuo [12], and were described in the following subsections.
Table 1 shows the list of variables in the following content.
1. The Payoffs of Air Cargo Carriers
Because the freightage of air cargo might vary from one
good to another, we focused on the freightage for two types of
services: ordinary and priority. Usually, the priority cargo
could be transported by passenger flights if the cargo space
was available or the schedule of cargo flights did not meet the
requirement of delivery. The ordinary cargo, on the other hand,
would be transported primarily by cargo flights.
As shown in Eq. (1), the payoff of air cargo carrier k was
partitioned into three parts, i.e., the revenue from ordinary
cargo, the revenue from priority cargo, and the costs of airfreight services. That is,

πk =

∑ (TR

k1
ij

+ TRijk 2 − TCijk )

(1)

ij ∈L

k

For the segment ij, the revenue from the ordinary and the
priority cargo was formulated as follows:

TRijkm = ∑ OFijklm × qijklm

m = 1, 2

(2)

l

qijklm = Qijlm × Pijklm

m = 1,2

(3)

2. The Demands of Air Cargo from Forwarders
Followed by Section 2.1, the share of air cargo from forwarder l to carrier k of OD pair ij as shown in Eq. (4) was
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Table 1. List of symbols and notations (in the order of appearance).

TR km
ij

description
payoff function of air cargo carrier k
revenue from ordinary (m = 1) and priority (m = 2)
cargo of carrier k of OD pair ij

TCijk

costs of air cargo services of carrier k of OD pair ij

notations

π

k

Lk
OFijklm
qijklm
Qijlm

total demand from forwarder l of OD pair ij

klm
ij

P

Vijklm
X ijklm

α

km
ij

β

m
ij

δ aij
h
ij

y

h
a

Cap

A
Hk

∑e

Vijklm

m = 1, 2

(4)

k =1

Vijklm = α ijkm + X ijklm β ijm

h

)

+ λ h d a δ aij yijh ]φ ij

(6)

∀ij ∈ Lk , a ∈ Ak

(7)

h∈ H a∈A

Subject to:

y ≥ Fijak

∑y

h
ij

(8)

= 1 ∀ij ∈ Lk

(9)

h

yijh ∈ Binary ∀ij ∈ Lk , h ∈ H k

(10)

φ ij ≥ 0 ∀ij ∈ Lk

(11)

III. SOLUTION APPROACH

formulated based on a discrete choice model derived by BenAkiva and Lerman [1]. Furthermore, the utility function of
forwarder l choosing carrier k for type m cargo of OD pair ij
was formulated as a linear function of freightage, flight frequency and service reliability as shown in Eq. (5). The linear
utility is a commonly used functional form in previous studies
by Shyr and Chang [10], Shyr and Hung [11], and Shyr and Kuo
[12].

K

ij ∈ L

k

Eq. (7) described the capacity constraint of the network.

set of flight segment for carrier k
set of aircraft types for carrier k

Vijklm

∑ [ ∑ ∑ (T

δ aij ∈ Binary ∀ij ∈ Lk , a ∈ Ak

cargo volume on flight segment a for carrier k

e

TC k =

h

flight frequency of OD pair ij
dummy variable, 1 if OD pair ij was included on
segment a
dummy variable, 1 if OD pair ij was served by aircraft
type h
capacity of aircraft type h on flight segment a

Pijklm =

According to Lenormand’s statement, the importance of
passenger aircrafts in air freight will decrease. In other word,
his statement implies that to cope with the rapidly increasing
and competing air cargo market, most of the carrier will rely
more on the all-cargo or “combi” fleets than on the passenger
flights. But due to our limitation on collecting the cost data
from the “combi” fleets, our study would only focus on the
scheduling of all-cargo flights. Thus, we formulated the costs
of air cargo services as follows:

h
ij h
a ij a ij

flight distance of segment a

φ ij

3. The Costs of Air Cargo Services

∑ Cap φ δ

carrier specific constant in the utility function

fixed cost of aircraft type h
variable cost of aircraft type h

λh
da

k

share of type m cargo from forwarder l to carrier k of
OD pair ij
utility function of forwarder l choosing carrier k for
type m cargo of OD pair ij
service attributes such as freightage, flight frequency,
and service reliability provided by carrier k to forwarder l for type m cargo of OD pair ij in the utility
function
vector of coefficients in the utility function

Th

Fijak

set of service network of carrier k
ordinary (m = 1) and priority (m = 2) freightage for
forwarder l offered by carrier k of OD pair ij
demand of ordinary (m = 1) and priority (m = 2) air
cargo from forwarder l to carrier k of OD pair ij

the logistic demand function embedded in Eq. (4). Similar
forms have been used in the previous studies by Shyr and
Chang [10], Shyr and Hung [11], and Shyr and Kuo [12]. In
fact, our payoff function is a bell-shape, or quasi-concave
function as shown in these studies.

(5)

The form of our payoff function is nonlinear resulted from

Given the payoff functions in section 2, we solved the
market equilibrium by applying MATHEMATICA, software
developed by Varian [11]. The solution concept for the noncooperative game price competition approach was derived
from Owen [6] and Hansen [2]. The procedures of the heuristic approach for the mixed integer optimization problem are
summarized as follows:
Step 1: Calibrate the demand and cost model parameters formulated in section 2;
Step 2: Formulate the system of equations for the first order
condition of payoff function with respect to the
freightage of airline carriers;
Step 3: Solve the system of equations in Step 2 and find the
freightage under current flight frequency;
Step 4: Compute the predicted demand and market shares
with the freightage solved from Step 3;
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Table 2. Distribution of sample from various forwarders.
scale of firm
annual shipment
in 2004

employee &
operating capital

tonnage
< 600
600~1200
> 1200

sample size
5
23
12

percentage
12.5%
57.5%
30%

> 50 persons
> 8 millions

15

37.5%

25

62.5%

≦ 50 persons
≦ 8 millions

Table 3. Factor loadings of carriers’ service attributes.
service attributes
reputation of reliable service
on-time delivery
security and safety
tracking system of shipment
service attitudes
responsive to emergency
aircraft maintenance
violation of shipping guidance
damage claim service
reasonable freightage & frequency

factor 1
0.810
0.598
0.608
0.795
0.789
0.860
0.787
0.000
0.294
0.306

factor 2
0.000
0.105
0.529
0.367
0.291
0.257
0.119
0.925
0.812
0.846

Step 5: Find the optimal flight frequency by solving cost minimization scheduling problem using the predicted demand from Step 4;
Step 6: Repeat Step 3 with new flight schedule solved from
Step 5, and stop iteration if the variation of the freightage solved from Step 3 is within 1%, or if the number
of iterations exceeds 100.

IV. CASE STUDY
To calibrate the air cargo demand and the payoff function,
we design both stated preference and revealed preference
questionnaire for forwarders who have shipping demand from
Taiwan to the west coast of North America. From Table 2 we
found that most of our questionnaires are returned from medium-size forwarders. In the revealed preference data, we
collect the information regarding the annual shipment delivered by three air cargo carriers, as well as freightage, delivery
time, and service quality of these carriers. In the stated preference data, we have forwarders’ choices of carriers under
various scenarios of weekly flight frequency, freightage, and
delivery time.
As for the questions regarding to service quality, we have
forwarders’ ratings of ten attributes, as shown in Table 3, ranging from 1 for very poor to 5 for very good. Table 3 also shows
the factor loadings of these attributes in two major factors.
From Table 3 we learned that factor 1 represents service
quality on reliability and efficiency; while factor 2 represents
service quality on responsibility and cost-effectiveness. The
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Table 4. Factor scores of carriers’ service attributes.
factor 1

factor
carrier

mean

standard
deviation

factor 2
mean

CAL
23.145
3.2318
18.594
EVA
23.572
2.1148
18.538
Northwest
20.388
2.4264
15.886
Note: CAL as China Airline, and EVA as EVA Air.

standard
deviation
2.6346
1.6453
2.0670

Table 5. Model parameters for ordinary cargo: Taiwan to
the west coast of North America. (t values shown
in the parentheses)
variables

HVF

MLVF

CAL constant

0.8863
(3.2045)

0.8160
(3.9050)

EVA constant

0.4933
(1.3021)

0.5684
(2.6610)

freightage (NTD/kg)

-0.0410
(-11.234)

-0.0621
(-13.251)

weekly flight frequency

0.1034
(3.3877)

0.0935
(3.3868)

mean delivery time (hour)

-0.0093
(-3.4100)

-0.0073
(-3.2708)

service quality: factor 1

0.0724
(2.4502)

0.0924
(2.9502)

service quality: factor 2

0.0062
(0.1205)

0.0034
(0.1324)

L(β)
L(0)

-543.93
-952.62
-701.34
-1238.31
ρ2
0.22
0.23
% of correct prediction
61.49%
61.31%
Note: NTD as New Taiwan Dollar, 1 US Dollar = 32 NTD.

overall rankings as shown in Table 4 suggest that carriers’
service quality is between fair and very good. Among them,
EVA Air receives the highest ranking in both factors.
The calibrated parameters of the market share models are
shown in Table 5 for ordinary cargo and Table 6 for priority
cargo. The models are estimated separately by two sample
groups, i.e., the high-volume forwarders (HVF) and mediumto-low-volume forwarders (MLVF).
From Table 5 and Table 6 we found that the signs of the
parameters are consistent with a prioi, i.e., the negative signs
for freightage and delivery time, the positive signs for flight
frequency and service quality. Most of the t-values of these
parameters are significant, except for the coefficients of service quality. In other words, forwarders are more sensitive to
freightage, delivery time, and frequency rather than service
quality. In addition, the IIA (Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives) test suggests that the market share model is consistent with the assumption of Multinomial Logit (MNL).
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Table 6. Model parameters for priority cargo: Taiwan to
the west coast of North America. (t values shown
in the parentheses)
variables

Table 9. Freightage structure of three cargo carriers.
carrier
ordinary cargo (NTD/kg)
priority cargo (NTD/kg)
weekly cargo flights
weekly passenger flights
delivery time (hour)

HVF

MLVF

CAL constant

0.0444
(1.445)

0.0566
(1.263)

EVA constant

0.1299
(1.2785)

-0.1754
(-0.9011)

freightage (NTD/kg)

-0.0363
(-7.0440)

-0.055
(-8.1730)

weekly flight frequency

0.2122
(5.8190)

0.1914
(4.9186)

carrier

service quality: factor 1

0.0464
(0.8902)

0.0394
(0.9314)

CAL

service quality: factor 2

0.0004
(0.0624)

0.0009
(0.0148)

-329.47
-404.53
0.19
54.16%

-488.21
-620.23
0.21
60.01%

L(β)
L(0)

ρ2
% of correct prediction

CAL
80~100
85~105
8
6
18

EVA
80~100
85~105
8
6
18

Northwest
70~90
75~95
4
4
36

Table 10. Optimal freightage and shipment of priority cargo.

EVA

Northwest

forwarder type
total tonnage
shipment (tons)
freightage (NTD/kg)
profits (NTD)
shipment (tons)
freightage (NTD/kg)
profits (NTD)
shipment (tons)
freightage (NTD/kg)
profits (NTD)

HVF
1500
724.8
77.2
46,801,065
606.2
74.4
53,897,469
169.0
64.1
10,833,620

MLVF
100
58
82.6
4,801,285
30
80.6
2,364,861
12
71.0
837,830

Table 7. Operating cost of three air cargo carriers.
carrier
CAL
EVA

aircraft

B747-400F
MD-11F
DC10-10F
Northwest
DC10-30CF

loading
fixed cost
capacity (lb) (USD)
255,000
192,240
135,300
177,400

4352
3076
2068
2968

variable cost
(USD/mile)
23.22
16.97
12.19
13.44

Table 8. Weekly flights from Taiwan to the west coast of
North America.
route
distance (km) frequency
TPE – LAX
11,445
4
TPE – ANC – LAX
11,299
2
CAL
TPE - ANC - SFO
10,771
1
TPE – NRT - ANC
7,306
1
TPE - LAX
11,445
4
TPE – ANC - LAX
11,299
2
EVA
TPE – ANC - SFO
10,771
1
TPE – NRT - ANC
7,306
1
TPE – NRT – ANC - SFO
11,482
2
Northwest TPE – NRT – ANC - LAX
11,882
1
TPE – NRT – ANC
7,306
1
Note: codes of airports, ANC as Anchorage, AK, LAX as Los Angles, NRT as Tokyo Narita, SFO as San Francisco, and TPE as
Taipei.

Table 11. Optimal freightage and shipment of ordinary
cargo.
carrier

CAL

EVA

carrier

The cost and flight data of three carriers as shown in Tables
7 and 8 reveal the fact that CAL has the largest shipping capacity while the Northwest Airline has the oldest fleet with

Northwest

forwarder type
total tonnage
shipment (tons)
freightage: (NTD/kg)
profits (NTD)
shipment (tons)
freightage (NTD/kg)
profits (NTD)
shipment (tons)
freightage (NTD/kg)
profits (NTD)

HVF
MLVF
73,500
4,900
38,497
2,107
70.4
75.2
388,731,891 160,833,090
27,097
1,953
67.2
71.8
236,438,740 141,472,924
9,398
839
55.1
63.6
-29,830,485 55,448,564

smallest capacity. Table 9 shows that Northwest Airline has
slightly cheaper fair rate but much longer delivery time than its
opponents. And that might be the reason why Northwest
received the lowest scores in the rating of service quality.
Table 9 also shows the weekly passenger flights which may
carry priority cargo.
Given the payoff function derived from Tables 5 and 6,
we solve the market equilibrium problem by applying software MATHEMATICA developed by Varian [15] and produced Tables 10 and 11. From these two Tables we learned
that the freightage for the high-volume forwarders is about
5% cheaper than the one for the medium-to-low-volume forwarders.
This is consistent with the fact that high-volume forwarders
often have more bargaining power than their competitors.
Nevertheless, the fare rates of all carriers are about 5% lower
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Table 12. Optimal weekly frequency and the costs for CAL
cargo flights (the costs of Table 8 are shown in
parentheses).
scenario

route

Weekly
frequency

TPE – NRT – ANC – LAX
TPE – ANC - LAX
case 1:
some flights TPE – ANC - SFO
are direct
TPE – ANC - SFO -LAX
TPE - LAX
TPE – NRT – ANC
case 2:
TPE – ANC - SFO -LAX
all flights
are transfer TPE – ANC - SFO
TPE – ANC - LAX

1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
5

route

TPE – NRT – ANC - LAX
TPE - ANC – LAX
case 1:
some flights TPE – ANC – SFO
are direct
TPE – ANC – SFO - LAX
TPE - LAX
TPE – NRT – ANC
TPE – NRT - ANC - SFO
case 2:
all flights
TPE – ANC – SFO – LAX
are transfer TPE – ANC – SFO
TPE – ANC – LAX

weekly
frequency
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
1
6

Table 14. Comparison of carriers’ annual profits in NTD
under various scenarios (Case 0 for existing
schedule).

weekly
costs

scenario
CAL

case 0
563,309,059

case 1
442,933,083

case 2
426,295,619

EVA

382,626,026

644,361,109

624,126,414

47,094,324
(47,102,113)

Northwest

28,189,346

8,276,443

29,432,920

45,483,137
(47,102,113)

Table 13. Optimal weekly frequency and the costs for EVA
cargo flights (the costs of Table 8 are shown in
parentheses).
scenario
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weekly
costs

42,506,580
(39,132,037)

41,952,396
(39,132,037)

the route of TPE – ANC – LAX. On the other hand, EVA
should not only adopt the changes in CAL’s routes but also
add 2 weekly direct flights from Taipei to Los Angles.
Similarly, the schedule changes in case 2 include converting all CAL’s direct weekly flights between TPE and LAX to
drop by ANC for 3 flights and to drop by ANC and SFO for
one flight. As for EVA’s schedule, the adjustment is about the
same as in CAL, except that one of the direct flights between
TPE and LAX has been replaced by a new route, i.e., TPE –
NRT – ANC – SFO. With the provision of transfer flights in
case 2, CAL and EVA could reduce their operating cost by
3.4% and 1.3%, respectively.
Notably as shown in Table 14, we learned that although Case
2 offers the lowest operating cost among all scenarios, it is Case
1 that yields the maximum profit for EVA, the leading carriers
in the market. On the other hand, neither CAL nor Northwest
could garner more profits under Case 1 scenario in comparison
with Case 0. In other words, in the oligopolistic market, it is
very likely that the leader would not only have the largest share,
but also earn much more profit than its opponents.

V. CONCLUSION
The major findings of our study are as follows:

than the existing freightage structure. The results imply that
carriers can offer more discounts to forwarders with higher
demand to attract more forwards and increase revenues.
Meanwhile, CAL would have the largest share and the highest
freightage in the market for both ordinary and priority cargo.
And that is consistent with the fact that CAL, who has the
largest shipping capacity, is the leader of the market.
Tables 12 and 13 show the adjusted schedules of cargo
flights for CAL and EVA1. Due to the limitation of our access
to costs data, we could only consider the outbound operation
costs for domestic airlines in the case study. Additionally,
some of the flights between TPE and LAX remain direct in
case 1 while none of direct flights exists in case 2. By comparing Tables 8, 12, and 13 we learned that in case 1, CAL
should extend the route of TPE – NRT – ANC to cover LAX,
and should drop by SFO in one of the flights that covers

1. According to the shipping demand model, forwarders are
more sensitive to freightage, delivery time, and frequency
than to service quality.
2. The optimal freightage for high-volume forwarders (MVF)
is about 5% cheaper than that for the medium-to-lowvolume forwarders (MLVF). And the optimal fare rates of
all carriers are about 5 percent lower than the existing
freightage structure. In other words, our results suggest that
carriers can offer more discounts to forwarders with higher
demand to attract more forwards and increase revenues.
3. The leader of air carriers would have not only the largest
share, but also the highest freightage for both ordinary and
priority cargo. As a result, the leader would garner more
profit than its opponents.
4. The adjusted flight schedule shows that carriers could further reduce their operating cost by 1% to 3% with the provision of transfer flights.

1

To extend the scope and the application of our study, we
suggest the following directions for future research:

Given the fact that we do not have access to the cost data of Northwest
Airlines, we assume the schedules of Northwest remain unchanged.
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1. The service network of air cargo carriers from Taiwan
should be expanded to include the entire continent of North
America.
2. A more efficient algorithm is needed to deal with the
scheduling problem of the expanded network with variable
demand.
3. Code sharing and other forms of airline alliances should be
integrated into the pricing and scheduling of air cargo market.
Namely, with the ever increasing capacity of computing
power, our approach is an effective way to incorporate oligopolistic competition behavior into the scheduling problem
of cargo flights. On the other hand, our limitation in data
acquisition prevents us from analyzing the market in greater
detail. We suggest that if the cost data of all carriers in the
market were available, the development of a more comprehensive example in the future study would be necessary.
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